Tag Archives: Robin Dunbar
From Neural ‘Is’ to Moral ‘Ought’
This talk takes its inspiration from Joshua Greene’s ‘From neural ‘is’ to moral ‘ought’: what are the moral implications of neuroscientific moral psychology?’ He says: “Many moral philosophers regard scientific research as irrelevant to their work because science deals with … Continue reading →
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Tagged Andy Clark, autism, Bayesian brain, blame, care, Charles Whitman, communication, Daniel Dennett, Daniel Kahnemann, David Eagleman, dual process theory, dualism, empathy, Ethical Naturalism, ethics, Felleman and Van Essen, free will, Golden Rule, Hermann von Helmholtz, intelligence, Is/Ought problem, iterated knowings, Jacob Hohwy, Jacques Ranciere, James Cargile, Jean Piaget, Joshua Greene, Karl Friston, Lawrence Kohlberg, Mike Gazzaniga, mirror-touch synaesthesia, moral development, morality, Neuro-ethics, Oxytocin, Patricia Churchland, Paul Piff, Peter Unger, Phineas Gage, physicalism, Platinum Rule, Predictive Mind, R. M. Hare, reputation, retribution, Richard Gregory, Robin Dunbar, rubber hand, Sally Anne test, social cognition, theory of mind, Two-level Utilitarianism, variational free energy, Vasopressin, William James, yawn contagion
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Trust
This is the fourteenth part of the ‘From Neural Is to Moral Ought’ series. It examines and elaborates on a particular point in Patricia Smith Churchland’s ‘Braintrust: What Neuroscience Tells Us about Morality’. 58: The Braintrust Thesis Previously: The idea has been introduced … Continue reading →
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Tagged Oxytocin, Patricia Churchland, Robert Sapolsky, Robin Dunbar
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Others, Orders and Oughts
(This is the eighth part of the ‘From Neural Is to Moral Ought’ series.) 34: The Purpose of Moral Theories The three main moral theories provide us with a mechanism for determining what we should do, how we should behave. They … Continue reading →
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Tagged Daniel Dennett, intentional stance, James Cargile, Lawrence Kohlberg, Robin Dunbar
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